We tested amnesic patients, patients with frontal lobe lesions, and control subjects with the deferred imitation task, a nonverbal test used to demonstrate memory abilities in human infants. On day 1, subjects were given sets of objects to obtain a baseline measure of their spontaneous performance of target actions. Then different event sequences were modeled with the object sets. On day 2, the objects were given to the subjects again, first without any instructions to imitate the sequences, and then with explicit instructions to imitate the actions exactly as they had been modeled. Control subjects and frontal lobe patients reproduced the events under both uninstructed and instructed conditions. In contrast, performance by the amnesic patients did not significantly differ from that of a second control group who had the same opportunities to handle the objects but were not shown the modeled actions. These findings suggest that deferred imitation is dependent on the brain structures essential for declarative memory that are damaged in amnesia, and they support the view that infants who imitate actions after long delays have an early capacity for long-term declarative memory.
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Distinctions between different types of memory have been made by neuroscientists (1) (2) (3) and experimental psychologists working with adults (4, 5) and with children and infants (6) (7) (8) . TIwo divisions are commonly recognized. One refers to the capacity to acquire specific facts and events that are accessible to conscious recollection, usually termed explicit or declarative (2, 5) , and is typically tested by asking the learner to study a list of words, a story, or an event and relate it after a delay. In contrast, implicit or nondeclarative memory refers to the capacity to acquire skills and strategies that are not accessible to conscious recollection, as well as simple forms of classical conditioning and the phenomenon of priming.
Neuropsychological evidence for such a distinction has been obtained from studies of amnesic patients with damage to the medial temporal lobe or midline diencephalon (9) . Amnesic patients can acquire new skills but without the phenomenal awareness that they possess new knowledge. For example, performance on tasks such as mirror reading improves at a normal rate across several sessions, but the patients do not explicitly remember having previously practiced the task (10) .
They know how to perform the task but do not remember that they ever practiced the task.
An important question is how and when declarative memory develops. Some have proposed that the limbic/diencephalic brain structures supporting declarative memory develop later than nondeclarative memory (11, 12) . The late development of declarative memory would provide an account of infantile amnesia-i.e., the inaccessibility of memories dating from the first few years of human life. Recently, an alternative view has been presented: namely, that limbic and diencephalic brain structures are functional in early life and that infants possess an early capacity for declarative memory (13) (14) (15) . This work, carried out with various subject populations, has suggested that the tasks used to test infant memory in fact require declarative memory. The tasks that have been used typically require recognition of a correct choice out of two or more alternatives after delays not longer than a few hours (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) .
To study infant memory across much longer intervals, researchers use deferred imitation tasks to show that infants will imitate novel actions that had been modeled with objects after delays from 24 hours to as long as 1 year (7, (17) (18) (19) (20) . Mandler (6) proposed that deferred imitation tasks require recall (i.e., declarative memory) when the events tested are entirely novel at the time of the learning session, the subjects are not allowed to practice the actions before they are tested, and the actions are not modeled again after the initial "learning" session.
There are other possible interpretations of deferred imitation tasks that do not rely on declarative memory. Subjects might learn a sensorimotor association between an object and an action by observation alone, such that the later sight of the object will automatically trigger the action. A variant of this idea is that young infants represent actions as tightly linked to their associated objects (21) . If this linking takes place within one or two exposures to an action-object pair, deferred imitation might be similar to skill learning or conditioning, which are tasks of nondeclarative memory that amnesic patients perform as well as normal adults (9) .
Another possibility is that the deferred imitation task is analogous to priming tasks. When given three-letter stems for words that have been studied and instructions to complete the stems with the first word that comes to mind, amnesic patients perform nearly as well as control subjects (22, 23) . However, when explicit instructions are given to report the words on the studied list, amnesic patients are impaired relative to control subjects (23) . In the case of the deferred imitation test, if the action modeled with an object is considered to be a single unit of representation (ust as a word can be considered a single unit), then presentation of part of that unit (e.g., the object) may be analogous to the three-letter cues in word-stem completion priming, and the action may be analogous to producing the remaining letters of the target word. Thus, infants might succeed on deferred imitation tasks in the same manner as amnesic patients succeed when they are asked to respond with the first thing that comes to mind.
To reduce the likelihood that the deferred imitation task is mediated simply by a stimulus-response association between an object and an action, one can require subjects to imitate individual actions in the same order that they were modeled (7, 17) . This procedure is similar to serial recall in which, following Abbreviations: WAIS-R, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised; WMS-R, Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised; E, experimenter.
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The publication costs of this article were defrayed in part by page charge payment. This article must therefore be hereby marked "advertisement" in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §1734 solely to indicate this fact. a retrieval cue, subjects recall a sequence of items, such as a prose passage. The sequence of items to be recalled can be determined either by causal or arbitrary relationships among the items (see Procedure). Infants perform better on deferred imitation tasks ordered by causal relations (7, 17) , just as older children and adults do when verbally recalling events and stories (24) (25) (26) . These findings raise the possibility that performance on these tasks is mediated by the same kind of memory. Nevertheless, it is still unknown whether or not declarative memory is required to perform the deferred imitation task.
To determine the kind of memory that supports performance in the deferred imitation task, we tested control subjects, amnesic patients, and patients with frontal lobe lesions with the same procedure used to test long-term memory in infants. Although lesions restricted to the frontal lobe do not produce amnesia (27, 28) , performance on memory tasks by amnesic patients can be influenced by frontal lobe dysfunction, particularly on tasks requiring memory for temporal order (29) . Moreover, amnesic patients with Korsakoff syndrome typically have frontal lobe atrophy (30) . To evaluate the importance of the frontal lobes and medial temporal lobediencephalic structures for memory of action sequences, we tested patients with damage limited to the frontal lobes, amnesic patients with Korsakoff syndrome, and amnesic patients with hippocampal formation damage. Age-and IQmatched control subjects were divided into two groups. One control group (experienced controls) was tested in the same manner as the patients. The other control group (inexperienced controls) was given the tasks in the same manner except this group was never shown the targeted actions. This control condition was used to measure the extent to which performance might change across test sessions simply because the subjects have repeated opportunities to examine and manipulate the objects (18, 19 Procedure. Eight deferred imitation tasks were used. Each task consisted of three actions, which were modeled in the same order for each of the subjects (except in the inexperienced control group, who were not shown the actions). For four tasks (causal), the order in which the actions were modeled was based on enabling or causal relations. For example, in one task we demonstrated the Bernoulli effect. We turned on a blow dryer, placed a balloon in the air stream, and then tilted the blow dryer to show that the balloon would remain captured in the airstream. This effect cannot be successfully demonstrated in any other order. For the four other tasks (arbitrary), the three actions were arbitrarily ordered. For example, we modeled the construction of a picture by folding and unfolding a piece of paper, cutting off its corners, and drawing a star. The same result can be obtained regardless of the order in which the actions are performed.
The test sessions were structured as tasks of learning and recalling words. A list of 15 simple English words with four to eight letters was presented as a word-learning task. The deferred imitation tasks were presented as distractor tasks that were interposed between word presentation and efforts at word recall. In this way, we attempted to administer the deferred imitation tasks as incidental events in the same way that they are typically given to nonverbal infants.
The study was conducted in four phases, which were videotaped for later scoring. In phase 1 the experimenter (E) read the words aloud to the subject with the instructions to attend to the words. Then E told the subject: "Now I am going to have you do some things to keep you from thinking of those words. I will give you different sets of objects which I want you to handle, manipulate, or do whatever you like with them. It is important that you pay close attention to the objects, so please do not talk while you are handling them." Then E brought out, one at a time, each of the object sets. The subjects were given 1 min to manipulate each object set (baseline condition). After the eighth set of objects was removed, the subject was asked to repeat aloud as many of the words on the list as could be remembered. E then instructed the subject that recall of the words would be tested again later.
Phase 2 followed immediately. For subjects in the amnesic, frontal lobe, and experienced control groups, E said, "Now I want you to observe some objects while I manipulate them. Please pay close attention, do not talk, and try not to think of the words that I read to you earlier." E then modeled the target actions for each of the eight sets of objects. For the inexperienced control group, E gave similar instructions with the exception that the subjects were told to look at but not touch the objects when they were placed on the table in front of them. Finally, E asked the subjects in all four groups to recall the words. After the recall test, E read the list again, telling the subjects that recall would be tested again on the next day.
On the next day, phase 3 began when the subjects were asked to repeat the words that they had been read the day before. E then read the words again, instructing the subjects to remember them. Then, each object set was presented for 1 min in exactly the same manner as during phase 1, and the subjects were told they could handle them as they wished (uninstructed condition).
In phase 4, which followed immediately, memory for the actions associated with each set of objects was tested explicitly (instructed condition). For the amnesic, frontal lobe, and experienced control subjects, E said, "I want you to show me as accurately as you can remember the actions I performed yesterday and the order in which I performed them." For the inexperienced control subjects, E said, "For some participants in this study, I demonstrated particular kinds of actions that I modeled in a particular order with each set of objects. I would like you to guess what those actions might have been and the order in which I modeled them." After a subject was clearly finished with an object set, it was removed and the next set was presented until the subject had an opportunity to manipulate all eight sets.
Subjects were questioned on two occasions to assess their understanding of the purpose of the study. After the uninstructed condition on the second day, E asked, "Did you think that there was any connection between what you were doing and what I did the day before? When you manipulated the objects today, were you influenced by the actions you saw me perform with them yesterday?" After the instructed condition on the second day, E further inquired, "What do you think is the purpose of this experiment? At any point in the experiment did you expect to be asked to demonstrate the actions I performed for you on the first day?" Subjects who expressed any understanding of the purpose of the experiment were asked when it occurred to them.
The videotaped sessions were scored by assistants skilled in coding deferred imitation tasks. Intercoder reliability exceeded 95%. For each of the eight tasks, the total number of different target actions performed was calculated. To evaluate memory for the sequences in which the actions had been modeled, the number of different pairs of actions produced in the correct target order was also calculated. For the latter measure, only the first occurrence of each target action was included to reduce the likelihood of assigning credit for a sequence being produced accidentally as the result of repeating some of its elements. If the subject produced all three actions in the target order, credit was given for two sequence pairs.
RESULTS
Actions. The number of actions performed by each subject during each phase of the experiment was submitted to a 4 x 2 x 3 mixed-design analysis of variance. The between-subjects factor was group (amnesic patients, frontal lobe patients, experienced control subjects, inexperienced control subjects). The within-subjects factors were task type (causal, arbitrary) and assessment condition (baseline, uninstructed, and instructed).
The mean number of actions (averaged across the four causal and four arbitrary tasks) performed by each group during each of the three phases of the experiment (baseline, uninstructed, and instructed) is shown in Fig. 1 instructed memory conditions than in the baseline condition for the experienced control subjects (baseline, M = 3.8; uninstructed, M = 8.6; instructed, M = 9.6) and frontal lobe patients (baseline, M = 2.5; uninstructed, M = 8.5; instructed, M = 8.2) but not for the amnesic patients (baseline, M = 2.4; uninstructed, M = 4.4; instructed, M = 4.0). Significant differences were also found among the groups in both the uninstructed and instructed memory conditions, but not in the baseline condition. Specifically, Tukey tests (P = 0.05) revealed that the experienced control subjects and frontal lobe patients performed significantly more actions in both memory conditions than either the inexperienced control subjects or amnesic patients, whose scores did not differ from each other. Finally, a main effect was also found for task type [F (1, 22) = 10.89; P < 0.01], indicating that significantly more actions from the causal sequences (M = 5.7) were performed than from the arbitrary sequences (M = 4.1).
Sequences. The number of sequences (averaged across the four causal and four arbitrary tasks) performed by subjects in the order in which they were modeled is shown in Fig. 2 . The maximum number of sequences that can be performed on each of the three-step tasks is two (a score of 1 for each ordered pair of actions); thus, a maximum score of 8 can be awarded for each task type. A 4 x 2 x 3 mixed-design analysis of variance (group, task type, and assessment) revealed main effects for group [F(3, 21) = 15.83; P < 0.01] and assessment [F(2, 20) = 26.55; P < 0.001], which were qualified by a significant interaction between them, F(6, 40) = 5.66; P < 0.001. One-way analyses of variance for simple effects of assessment were significant for the experienced control subjects [F(2, 20) = 35.25; P < 0.001] and frontal lobe patients [F(2, 20) = 11.69; P < 0.001] but not for the inexperienced control subjects or the amnesic patients. Tukey tests (P = 0.05) showed that both the experienced control subjects and frontal lobe patients performed significantly more ordered sequences in the memory conditions (uninstructed: experienced controls M = 3.9; frontal lobe patients M = 3.5; instructed: experienced controls M = 4.5; frontal lobe patients M = 3.7) than in the baseline condition (experienced controls M = 0.88; frontal lobe patients M = 0.33). Performance in the two memory conditions did not significantly differ for either group. A comparison among all four groups also showed significant differences in the uninstructed [F(3, 21) = 11.19; P < 0.001] and instructed memory conditions [F(3, 21) = 19.58; P < 0.001] but not in the baseline condition. Tukey tests (P = 0.05) indicated that both the experienced controls and frontal lobe patients scored significantly higher than either the amnesic patients (uninstructed M = 1.4; instructed M = 1.3) or the inexperienced control subjects (uninstructed M = 0.57; instructed M = 0.57), whose scores did not differ from each other. Finally, a main effect for task type more causal sequences were performed in the correct order than arbitrary sequences (2.2 vs. 1.3).
Words Recalled. As expected, the amnesic patients recalled fewer words (M = 0.15) than the other groups (frontal lobe patients M = 4.5; experienced control group M = 4.7; and inexperienced control group M = 6.2).
Questions About the Purpose of the Study. In response to the questions asked after the uninstructed condition on day 2, all of the experienced control subjects and frontal lobe patients and five of the amnesic patients believed that they were influenced by the actions E had modeled. Note that a subject who believes that she or he was influenced by earlier events is not necessarily stating that she or he remembers the events. Indeed, three of these five amnesic patients added that they had difficulty remembering what had occurred on the previous day. In response to the questions asked after the instructed condition on day 2, one experienced control subject and no amnesic or frontal lobe patient described correctly that they knew the purpose of the study on the first day. But by the second day, four of the amnesic patients thought the study was to evaluate their memory problem in general. The remaining amnesic patients (n = 3), experienced control subjects (n = 7), and frontal lobe patients (n = 3) stated that they believed they were to remember the actions modeled.
DISCUSSION
The results indicate that amnesic patients are impaired in deferred imitation tasks, tasks that are commonly used to test recall in infants. First, the experienced control subjects reproduced more actions and action sequences than the amnesic patients in both the uninstructed and instructed memory conditions. Second, performance by the amnesic patients did not significantly differ at any assessment period from that of the inexperienced controls, who never saw the sequences. Third, the pattern of results exhibited by the experienced control subjects resembled the patterns found in verbal tasks of recall. Specifically, more of the causal tasks were performed than the arbitrary tasks, just as in previous studies using verbal measures of recall with older children and adults (24, 25) . This same result has also been reported in other studies using deferred imitation with infants (7, 17) .
The results also showed that the patients with frontal lobe lesions were able to recall the actions and also the order in which they were modeled. This finding might seem surprising, given that some tests of temporal order are sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction. However, deficits in temporal ordering are typically found when tasks require frontal lobe patients to remember a sequence of unrelated episodes or unrelated word lists (29, 34) or to judge the recency of presented stimuli (35) . The deferred imitation tasks in the present study involved related rather than unrelated events. Accordingly, the patients with frontal lobe lesions may have been able to perform well because the information to be remembered was coherent.
The amnesic patients were not able to perform the sequences they had seen in either the instructed or uninstructed conditions. Thus, the uninstructed condition did not automatically or nonconsciously prime them to perform the sequences. Although the number of actions and sequences performed by the amnesic patients did increase from baseline to the two memory conditions (marginally in the case of the actions and not significantly in the case of the sequences), this small improvement in performance relative to baseline likely reflects some residual declarative memory capacity in the amnesic patients. Note that, even in the verbal memory recall task, the amnesic patients obtained an above-zero score. We conclude that the deferred imitation task depends largely on declarative memory rather than on skill learning or priming.
Because infants can do deferred imitation, they must have an early capacity for declarative memory that can support relatively long-lasting recall memories. What, then, accounts for infantile amnesia? Although recent research in monkeys and humans indicates that the primate hippocampus matures relatively early (36) and probably earlier than the neocortex (13, 37) , the hippocampus is only one part of a large neural system important for declarative memory (38) . It is not yet clear when this neural system becomes functionally mature. One important feature of early neural development is that there is initially an excess of synaptic connections and that the final adult pattern of connectivity is achieved by regressive events that include cell death, synapse elimination, and collateral elimination (39) . For example, the density of synapses, corrected for volume change, reaches a maximum of about 150% of the adult level at 8 months of age in the visual cortex (40) . An earlier study of frontal cortex suggested that in this region maximum synaptic density is reached more slowly, at about 2 years of age (41) . Moreover, by 3 to 4 years of age, metabolic activity in the cortex, as measured by positron emission tomography, reaches twice the adult level (42) . These stages of development are followed by gradual synapse elimination (40) and the decline of metabolic activity (42) during a period of several years. Although the functional implications of these regressive events are still unknown, it is apparent that the human brain reaches its final adult pattern of connectivity only after a protracted period of development. This gradual development, reflected in both progressive and regressive events, provides a way to understand why declarative memory may not be sufficiently developed to provide rich and enduring recollections, even though some capacity for declarative memory is available in early life.
The present study adds to a growing body of literature suggesting that some of the tasks used to test memory in human infants are tasks of declarative memory, tasks that are failed by amnesic patients and by adult and infant monkeys with limbic/ diencephalic lesions (13) (14) (15) . This literature provides compelling evidence that human infants have an early capacity for declarative memory. Previous studies of infant memory have used relatively short delays (e.g., delayed nonmatching to sample tasks and visual paired-comparison tests) and have depended primarily on recognition tests (13, 15) . Deferred imitation provides a reliable and valid method to test the early capacity for recall memory and to explore the basis of infantile amnesia. Deferred imitation should be particularly useful in studies spanning long delays-i.e., delays that span the several years over which infantile amnesia is observed (19) .
